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1. Introduction 
A norm is a rule that prescribes behavior –that is, any statement of the form ‘in 
situation x, you ought to do y’. For instance, all laws, codes of honor, moral principles, or 
religious commandments are norms according to this definition.1   
Norms are a fundamental ingredient of human societies. Indeed, prominent social 
researchers like Emile Durkheim or Talcott Parsons have emphasized that human behavior 
is shaped by norms and that (some) norms foster cooperation and pro-social behavior, 
thus facilitating the attainment of social order –see also Arrow (1974), and Elster (1989). 
In addition, social psychologists and other social researchers have pointed out that 
norms affect behavior because they first affect motivation. When someone internalizes a 
norm (Elster, 1989; Becker, 1996; Gintis, 2003), she becomes emotionally attached to it, 
that is, painful emotions get triggered when she deviates from it (shame, guilt), or when 
others deviate (anger, indignation). As a result, people tend to behave according to 
internalized norms in order to avoid (1) remorse (internal punishment) or (2) sanctions 
from an angry party (external punishment). 2
This paper formalizes these ideas and investigates how norms affect behavior using 
the standard, well-known apparatus of preferences, rationality, games, and equilibrium 
concepts. To model the idea that (some) people care about norms, however, the model 
abandons the standard hypothesis that all players are selfish –i.e., exclusively motivated 
by their own consumption and leisure (material interest). 
The results in this paper will be of particular interest for behavioral and 
experimental economists, who have gathered in the last 30 years an impressive amount of 
evidence contradicting the selfishness hypothesis. As a particular application of the model, 
I focus on a norm of distributive justice that exhibits a concern for both efficiency and 
maximin (the EM-norm), and show that if some agents have internalized only that norm, 
while remaining agents do not care about any norm at all, the model is then consistent 
with a large and varied array of well-replicated experimental results.3
                                                 
1 This definition is indeed very wide-ranging, and one may find more restrictive ones in the literature 
on norms -I survey this literature in López-Pérez (2005). 
2 The role played by the external punishment is particularly important when we consider social norms 
–i.e., norms that have been internalized by sufficiently many people in a group and are hence “partly 
sustained by their approval and disapproval” (Elster, 1989, p. 99). We must note two things in this 
regard: (1) People may internalize norms even if they are not social (see the discussion on private 
norms by Elster, 1989), and (2) there exist norms or morals which nobody cares about (at least if we 
circumscribe our attention to a particular group or society): Thus, the norm to wear black in a 
funeral was not a social norm in traditional China. 
3 In this paper, efficiency refers to the sum of players’ material payoffs, and not to Pareto efficiency. 
Maximin or need refers to the worst-off player’s income. López-Pérez (2004) study alternative norms 
(like egalitarian ones). 
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The model explains, for instance, why people cooperate conditionally (more 
generally, the model predicts that people respect binding norms in a reciprocal manner –
i.e., they are more willing to comply if others comply as well), why first movers in a 
sequential social dilemma cooperate significantly more than players of a simultaneous 
dilemma, why punishment and cooperation depend on the menu of choices, why passive 
players are usually not punished, or why competitive markets induce principled people to 
behave as self-interested ones do. 
The model is related to recent theories of social preferences and reciprocity, which 
also relax the selfishness hypothesis.4 Rabin (1993) models reciprocity (that is, the idea 
that people are kind (unkind) to those who are kind (unkind) to them), and Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger (2004) extend Rabin’s ideas to multiple-player and dynamic games. 
Levine (1998) assumes type-based altruism and spitefulness, and both Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) propose models of inequity-averse players. 
Finally, Charness and Rabin (2002) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) introduce both 
reciprocity and distributional concerns.5
Almost no one of these models explicitly introduces norms, the only exception being 
the reciprocity model of Charness and Rabin (2002). This model is very complex and 
presents a series of problems, though.6 Indeed, Charness and Rabin do not see it ‘as being 
primarily useful in its current form for calibrating experimental data, but rather as 
providing progress in conceptualizing what we observe in experiments’ (p. 851). In line 
with this idea, one might view my model as a tractable version of theirs. 
The model here has a number of advantages with respect to the other models. 
First, it explains better the experimental evidence in the range of games that I analyze 
here and in López-Pérez (2004). One crucial reason for this is that it assumes that agents 
care about history. More precisely, people’s utility depends on whether others (or 
themselves) misbehaved –i.e., deviated from a binding norm- in the past. Hence, the 
model takes into account procedural justice. This is a key difference with outcome-based 
utility models like the inequity aversion ones. 
Second, and contrary to Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and 
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) the model here is not based on the Psychological Game 
Theory of Geanakoplos et al. (1989), so that agents’ utility does not depend on their 
beliefs. That makes the model much more parsimonious. Further, and contrary to Levine 
(1998), agents’ utility does not depend on the co-players’ types, thus significantly reducing 
                                                 
4 Fehr and Schmidt (2006), Camerer (2003), and López-Pérez (2004) survey this literature. 
5 Except the seminal paper by Rabin (1993), all these models are quite general in that they apply to 
a large class of games. There exist some interesting theories which are more restrictive –thus, Cox, 
Friedman and Gjerstad (2006) only applies to sequential two-player games of perfect information. 
For expositional brevity, I do not consider them here –again, see Fehr and Schmidt (2006) on this. 
6 For a good discussion of this point, consult Fehr and Schmidt (2006, pp. 36-37).  
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the number of equilibria. In fact, my model predicts a unique equilibrium outcome in all 
the games that I analyze here, which is crucial to facilitate experimental testing. 
Last, but not least, the model has a broader field of application because it explicitly 
introduces norms. Although I do not address such questions here, one might use it to 
explain why people tell the truth and punish cheaters contrary to their material interest, or 
why people follow rules of etiquette, or norms regulating sexual relations. The other 
models have troubles in explaining such behavior because they posit that utility depends 
on money allocations and/or on beliefs about such allocations -and it is unclear how, say, 
sexual intercourse may affect those things! 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and 
discusses its key assumptions. Section 3 studies how the EM-norm affects cooperation, 
competition, and punishment in different games. These predictions are summarized and 
briefly compared with those from other models in section 4. Section 5 concludes by 
mentioning some limitations of the theory, together with possible extensions. 
2. A Model with Norms 
Consider a n-player, extensive form game of perfect recall Γ . Let N = {1,…,n} 
denote the set of players,  denote a terminal node,  denote player i’s utility payoff 
at , and  denote player i’s monetary payoff at .
z )( zu i
z )(zxi z 7 As  and  may differ for 
some players, it makes sense to distinguish between game 
)( zu i )(zxi
Γ  and its associated lab game. 
This is a mathematical object that contains the game form of Γ  -i.e., all things that Γ  
comprises except utility payoffs - and each monetary payoff . )( zu i )(zxi
2.1 Norms 
Norms are exogenous rules that select actions in lab games. Let  denote an 
information set and  denote the set of available actions at h . 
h
)(hA
Definition 1: A norm is a nonempty correspondence )(: hAh→Ψ  applying on any 
information set of any lab game, except on Nature’s ones. 
Throughout the paper, I will use indistinctively the following expressions: ‘The norm 
selects action  at information set ’, ‘the norm commends to choose a  at ’, and 
‘according to the norm, (the relevant mover) should choose a  at .’ 
a h h
h
Given that norms select actions, a player is said to respect or comply with norm Ψ  
at  if (i) her choice at  is consistent with h h Ψ  or if (ii) she is not the mover at . 
Otherwise, she deviates from the norm.
h
 Suppose then that play reaches terminal node . 
By considering all actions in the path of , one may obtain the set of players who 
z
z
                                                 
7 Apart of getting a monetary payment, players in some games might also consume goods and 
leisure in the history of . In that case,  should represent the material utility that player i gets 
from consumption and money. I will not pursue this topic further here, though. 
z )(zxi
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respected in the history of , Ψ z ),( zR Ψ , and its cardinality, ),( zr Ψ . If it is clear to 
which norm I refer, I will instead write  and )(zR )(zr . 
2.2 Preferences 
There are two types of players. Selfish players are standard money-maximizers who 
do not care about norms. To simplify, they are assumed to be risk-neutral, so that their 
utility function is 
)()( zxzu ii = . 
In contrast, the utility of a principled player at  depends on the money earned 
 and the history of . In other words, principled agents care about what they get and 
how they get it. Intuitively, different histories activate different emotions: If principled 
player A deviates from what an internalized norm commends then she feels ashamed or 
guilty, whereas if A complies but another player deviates then A feels angry at him.
z
)(zxi z
8 More 
precisely, the utility function of a principled player i  who has internalized norm Ψ  equals 
)()( zrzxi ⋅− γ                          if )(zRi∉ , )0 ( γ<  
    = { )(zui I(z)zxzx j
zRj
i ⋅⋅− ∉ )}({max)( )(α       if )(zRi∈ , ( α<0 ),               
where  is an indicator function that takes value 0 if nobody deviates –i.e., if 
- and 1 otherwise.  
)(zI
NzR =)(
2.3 The EM-Norm 
One may think of infinite correspondences satisfying definition 1. As a particular 
example, consider a norm that selects any action pointing towards an efficient and 
maximin outcome, conditional on others doing the same. More formally, let  denote 
the set of all monetary allocations of lab game
)(∆X
∆ . 
Definition 2: Allocation )(},...,{ 1 ∆∈= Xxxx n  is efficient-cum-maximin (EM) if it 
maximizes function 
}{min)( i
Ni Ni
i xxxF ∑
∈ ∈
+= δ                                                                      (1)  
over )(∆X , where δ<0 . An EM-path of ∆  is a path leading to an EM-allocation of 
. An EM-action is an action that belongs to an EM-path.∆  
Definition 3 (the EM-Norm): If  is on one EM-path, the EM-norm selects only 
the EM-actions in . Otherwise, the EM-norm selects the whole set . 
h
)(hA )(hA
In other words: As far as everybody respects the EM-norm, then one must strive to 
achieve an EM-allocation; but if it is known for certain that at least one player has deviated 
then any behavior is allowed –i.e., the norm is conditional in an extreme form. The reader 
                                                 
8 Therefore, norms shape utility. This explains why norms are defined to apply on lab games and not 
on proper games: Circularity problems would appear if norms depended on utility payoffs (an 
ingredient of games) and at the same time affected utility.  
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can verify that this is truly a norm –i.e., a nonempty correspondence selecting at least one 
action at any information set of any lab game.9
Similar norms may be obtained by conveniently changing function (1). Thus, a 
crude egalitarian norm might correspond to the following function 
}{max}{min)( iNiiNi
e xxxF
∈∈
−= .                                                          (2) 
The EM-norm is indeed extremely simple, and one might think of more 
sophisticated norms –for examples, consult López-Pérez (2005). For reasons that I 
mention later, however, it is posited that the EM-norm is the only norm that all principled 
players care about. Taking this into account, let ρ  denote the fraction of principled players 
in the population –this parameter is common knowledge. 
2.4 Information, Equilibrium Concept, and a Refinement 
Unless otherwise noted, I assume for simplicity that each player’s type is common 
knowledge. Taking into account this, and as I consider both simultaneous and sequential 
games, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a natural solution concept to use.  
We will concentrate our attention on pure strategy SPE. Now, some games may 
have multiple equilibria. In that case, and if at least one of the players is principled, I 
assume that the EM norm shapes beliefs by acting as a focal point (Schelling, 1960; 
Sugden, 1989). To formalize this, let  denote a pure strategy SPE of a game, and  
denote the associated vector of players’ monetary payoffs. 
's )'(sx
Definition 4: Equilibrium  is EM if  maximizes function (1) among all 
equilibria vectors  of the game. 
's )'(sx
)(sx
To put it like that, an SPE is EM if it attains the ‘fairest’ equilibrium outcome (at 
least from the point of view of a principled player). Note that definition 4 can be easily 
extended to other norms of distributive justice by changing the corresponding function. 
Assumption 1: A principled agent will play action  with some probability only if 
 is part of an EM equilibrium strategy –if any such equilibrium exists. 
a
a
That is, principled players find obvious or prominent an EM equilibrium. Note well 
that the focal point acts in a heterogeneous way as it only affects expectations about 
principled players’ behavior. 
2.5 Discussion 
Let me start with three remarks on principled types’ utility function. First, 
parameter γ  may be interpreted as an internalization index. Note that ceteris paribus the 
intensity of a deviator’s bad feelings is assumed not to depend on the specific deviation 
she makes. That is, all deviations are equally ‘bad’. Although this assumption is clearly 
                                                 
9 If  is not bounded then there might not be an EM-allocation, though. Consult López-Pérez 
(2005) on this point. 
)(∆X
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unrealistic, it greatly simplifies the model and suffices to explain many experimental facts. 
I come back to this issue in the conclusion. 
Second, the more the people who respect the norm, the more badly a principled 
deviator feels. For simplicity, I have modeled this by means of a linear function, but any 
strictly increasing one would give the same qualitative results in the games I analyze. 
However, it is important for the results that no principled deviator feels badly at  if all 
the other players deviate as well. This implies that a principled player never complies with 
an internalized norm if (a) compliance is at odds with her material interest and if (b) she 
expects all other players to deviate, an implication that will be extensively used in the 
applications.
z
10
Third, parameter α  measures aggressiveness –more precisely, an angry player  is 
willing to spend 
i
α  monetary units in order to reduce the best-off deviator’s monetary 
payoff in one unit. Note that α  is independent of the specific deviation that triggers the 
anger, a hypothesis that is again made for simplicity –in the conclusion I discuss this issue. 
For analogous reasons, I also assume that anger and the associated tendency impulse to 
retaliate focus on the best-off deviator if there are multiple deviators. 
I pass now to consider a different question, that is, why should we assume that the 
EM-norm is the only norm that principled players care about? Note first that we must 
assume something about the specific norms that principled players have internalized in 
order to obtain precise behavioral predictions in games and test the model. Further, the 
number of norms should not be too high in order to keep the model tractable. Ideally, one 
simple norm should be able to explain a significant fraction of the experimental results.  
This seems a difficult task because we know from sociologists and anthropologists’ 
reports that human societies have myriads of norms, and it is not easy to discern which 
the key ones are. A prominent candidate, though, appear to be norms of distributive 
justice because concepts like fairness or justice are often employed to justify behavior. 
The EM-norm, which views both efficiency and the welfare of the worst-off player(s) 
(and not, say, payoff equality) as the basic ingredients of distributive justice, is indeed an 
extremely rudimentary norm. In spite of this, we can explain a very good deal of the 
experimental evidence by assuming that principled people only care about it, as the results 
here and in López-Pérez (2004) attest. 
In any case, more experiments are required to investigate what behavior people 
deem fair or just. For instance, it might be that nations or groups of people differ in what 
they view as fair. Thus, economists might be more concerned about efficiency than others 
- consult Fehr et al. (forthcoming) for evidence on this. Nevertheless, it must be pointed 
out that the model here is flexible enough to include such ideas. For instance, one could 
                                                 
10 Taking into account some psychological evidence, I discuss the realism of this hypothesis (and its 
implications) in López-Pérez (2005). I also propose there alternative (and more complex) 
specifications. 
 7
introduce some heterogeneity by assuming that some principled people have internalized 
the EM-norm while others have internalized an egalitarian norm. 
3. Applications 
This section studies how the EM-norm affects cooperation, competition, and 
punishment in several games. 
3.1 Cooperation 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) Lab Game 
This lab game, represented at Figure 1, has received huge attention from 
experimentalists. The two players (John and Ana in the example) simultaneously decide 
whether they cooperate (action C) or defect (action D). Both earn monetary units if 
they cooperate, and if both defect. Further, a unilateral defector gets a ‘temptation’ 
payment of while a unilateral cooperator gets a normalized payoff of zero. Payoffs 
satisfy -i.e., defection strictly dominates cooperation in monetary terms- 
and  so that ( ) is the only EM-allocation and cooperation is the only EM-action. 
In short, there exists a stark conflict between self-interest and compliance with the norm.        
c
d
t
0>>> dct
tc >2 cc,
  John 
  C D 
C cc  ,  t,0  
Ana 
D 0,t  dd ,  
                      Figure 1: (Ana’s, John’s) Monetary Payoffs in the PD Lab Game 
To illustrate players’ utility payoffs, assume that Ana is selfish and John is principled 
(other cases can be analogously analyzed). Trivially, Ana’s utility coincides with her own 
pecuniary payoff. On the other hand, John gets some disutility (shame) if he deviates 
unilaterally from the EM-norm or if Ana does so (anger), but he feels no disutility if both 
players defect. Figure 2 represents all this.   
  John 
  C D 
C cc ,  γ−t,0  
Ana 
D tt ⋅− α ,  dd ,  
                  Figure 2: Utility Payoffs if Ana is Selfish and John is Principled 
Behavioral predictions are straightforward. First, mutual defection is the only Nash 
equilibrium if at least one player is selfish or if both players are principled and ct −<γ . 
Second, mutual cooperation is the unique refined equilibrium if both players are principled 
and ct −≥γ  - although mutual defection is another Nash equilibrium, it can be ruled out 
because it is not an EM equilibrium (assumption 1). 
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To sum up, principled players cooperate in a conditional manner in simultaneous 
dilemmas: They cooperate only if the other player is expected to cooperate as well. 
Intuitively, this idea also extends to a setting where players’ types are private information. 
More precisely, one can easily show that a principled player cooperates in the 
simultaneous PD if her prior is above threshold11
simρ  = γα
α
++−⋅+
⋅+
cttd
td
.                                                          (3) 
Consistent with the model, numerous experiments with one-shot prisoner’s 
dilemmas –consult Rapoport and Chammah (1965), and Rabin (1993) for surveys; and 
Sally (1995) for a meta-analysis- find that a significant proportion of players cooperate, 
and that cooperation strongly depends on the expectation that the co-player will cooperate 
as well. Thus, in one of the treatments reported by Croson (2000), subjects played ten 
times a PD lab game against different co-players and had to guess at the start of each 
round her co-player’s future choice. 83% of the participants that guessed their counterpart 
would cooperate cooperated themselves. On the contrary, when participants expected that 
their opponent would defect, only 32% of them cooperated.  
To finish, inspection of threshold (3) indicates that  depends negatively on 
and positively on and . Interestingly, the same occurs with the expected price of 
cooperation 
simρ
c t d
dct ⋅−+−⋅ )1()( ρρ  –i.e., the net, expected material gain from defection. 
Taking into account that cooperation is hindered as the threshold  grows, a law of 
demand follows: Cooperation decreases when its price increases. This prediction is again 
consistent with experimental evidence –see Rapoport and Chammah (1965, pp. 36-39), 
and Clark and Sefton (2001).  
simρ
Fostering Cooperation: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Mechanisms 
Assume now that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is played in a sequential manner –e.g., 
Ana chooses after observing John’s move. Apparently, this is a minor change. If the 
second player is principled, though, the sequential mechanism changes players’ incentives 
to comply with the EM-norm, and fosters cooperation. 
To understand this point, note first that the sequential PD has a unique EM-path. In 
it, both players cooperate one after the other, hence reaching the EM-allocation. As a 
result, the EM-norm commends the first mover to cooperate. Further, it also commends 
the second mover to cooperate if the first mover cooperates, but allows any action if the 
first mover defects (definition 3). Consequently, the first mover would be the only deviator 
from the EM-norm –i.e., the only person who ‘misbehaves’- if both players chose 
defection. This is a subtle but key difference with the simultaneous PD, in which both 
players count as deviators if they mutually defect. 
Given these norm prescriptions, the sequential PD has a unique Subgame Perfect 
Equilibrium for each parameter calibration. In this equilibrium (as one may easily prove), a 
                                                 
11 Note that condition  requires simρ≥1 ct −≥γ . 
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selfish second mover always defects while a principled second mover reciprocates the first 
mover’s choice if she is principled and ct −≥γ  -that is, she cooperates if he cooperated 
and defects if he defected- whereas she always defects if ct −<γ . 
Experimental evidence from Hayashi et al. (1999) and Clark and Sefton (2001) 
corroborates this. Second movers often cooperate conditional on the first mover’s choice, 
while unconditional cooperation is negligible. In addition, Clark and Sefton (2001) show 
that reciprocation falls as its material cost rises, something that is also consistent with the 
model, as reciprocation only occurs if ct −≥γ . 
With regard to the first mover, it is fairly clear that his optimal strategy depends on 
his type and the second mover’s. A selfish first mover cooperates only if the second mover 
is principled and ct −≥γ  –this follows simply from . In turn, a principled first 
mover cooperates if the other player is principled and 
dc >
} ,min{ ctdt −+⋅≥ αγ , or if she is 
selfish and dt +⋅≥αγ . This latter case is a bit paradoxical: The first mover cooperates 
even when he knows that his opponent will later defect! In that way, he avoids being the 
person who ‘spoiled’ cooperation, something that he finds particularly painful if dt +⋅≥αγ .  
The above mentioned results can be easily extended to an incomplete information 
setting. Since principled second movers reciprocate (if ct −≥γ ) and selfish ones always 
defect, a principled first mover cooperates in the sequential PD if 
ctd ⋅+⋅−⋅−<− ραργ )()1( , that is, if his prior is above threshold 
seqρ  = 
ct
td
+⋅
−⋅+
γ
γα
.                                                                  (4) 
Comparison between equations (3) and (4) indicates that >  if simρ seqρ ct −≥γ . 
That is, a principled mover in the simultaneous PD requires a larger prior to cooperate that 
a principled first mover in the sequential PD. This occurs because any deviation from the 
EM-norm (or from any conditional norm of cooperation) in the sequential PD is unilateral. 
As a result, a transgression is psychologically more disturbing (in expected terms) than in 
the simultaneous PD, in which it is possible that both players deviate simultaneously.  
When analyzing the simultaneous PD, we also proved that selfish players never 
cooperate. On the contrary, they cooperate in the sequential PD if they move first and –
this is again easy to prove- their prior belief is large enough. They find profitable to comply 
with the EM-norm because they understand that they can ‘emotionally force’ a principled 
second mover to comply as well.12  
To sum up, the last two paragraphs imply that first movers’ rate of cooperation in 
the sequential PD is significantly larger than the average cooperation rate in the 
simultaneous PD. This is consistent with the lab evidence from Hayashi et al. (1999) and 
Clark and Sefton (2001).  
                                                 
12 See Rabin (1993, p. 1296) on this regard. 
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 On Positive Reciprocity 
In some models of reciprocity -Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006)- one may distinguish between 
positive reciprocity (being kind with those who are kind) and negative one (being unkind 
with those who are unkind). Positive reciprocity implies that people are more kind with an 
active and kind player than with a passive player who makes no choice in the game.  
To illustrate this, consider again the sequential PD lab game but assume now that 
the first mover –that is, John- has only action C available –i.e., he is a passive player. The 
only active player is Ana, who must choose therefore between (Ana’s, John’s) allocations 
( ) and (cc  , 0 ,t ). Clearly, the above mentioned reciprocity models predict that Ana will 
choose ( 0 ,t ) significantly more if John is passive (call this the passive cooperation case) 
than if John actually chose ‘kind’ action C (active cooperation case). 
However, the available experimental evidence does not seem to support this 
prediction. Thus, Camerer (2003, pp.89-90) survey some results in this regard and 
concludes that the effect of positive reciprocity is insignificant or small. Consistently with 
such experimental evidence, my model predicts invariance, or no positive reciprocity. 
Indeed, Ana makes the same move in both cases whatever her type: She defects and 
attains allocation ( 0 ,t ) if she is selfish, and cooperates (the EM-action) if she is principled 
and ct −≥γ . 
The intuition behind the invariance result is twofold. On one hand, selfish types only 
care about available outcomes, and not about previous history, so that invariance makes 
no surprise. On the other hand, and in case everybody previously complied with the norm, 
it makes no difference for a principled player whether compliance happened because 
everybody was active and compliant or because everybody was passive –passive players, 
recall, respect the norm by definition. In other words, principled players treat equally well 
both passive players and active compliant players. 
What explains Invariance?   
The previous comparison has pointed out one key difference between my model 
and other models of reciprocity. However, models like Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000), and the model of quasi-maximin preferences of Charness and Rabin 
(2002) also predict invariance. This occurs because these models assume that players only 
care about the distribution of income –i.e., players have consequentialistic utility functions. 
Is it possible to discriminate between this explanation and the one this paper offers? 
Although I will investigate this issue in more detail and give some evidence when 
studying punishment, it may be worth to consider again the sequential PD. In this case, 
however, consider Ana’s behavior in the following two situations: (i) John is active and has 
chosen action D (active defection case), and (ii) John is passive and has only action D 
available (passive defection case). 
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Since Ana faces (Ana’s, John’s) allocations ( ) and  in both cases, a 
consequentialistic model predicts invariance –i.e., Ana always chooses the same allocation. 
My model, on the contrary, predicts some variance if Ana is principled. On one hand, she 
chooses ( ) in the active defection case because then she feels angry at John. On the 
other hand, Ana does not feel any anger at a passive John and moreover the EM-allocation 
is  if 
dd  , ),0( t
dd  ,
),0( t td <⋅+ )2( δ . Hence, she chooses  if ),0( t t and γ are large enough. 
To sum up, while a principled player may treat kindly a passive player, she will 
never do that with a deviator. This idea is absent in a consequentialistic model, but it is 
important to appreciate why institutions making tough decisions that affect others have 
incentives to signal that they had no other choice or were forced by external forces to do 
that. In such a way, other agents cannot blame institutions for violating prevailing norms 
and hence do not get angry at them. For instance, many European governments and 
politicians who advocate for reforms in their Welfare States often argue that Globalization 
leaves them no way out. Though some of them may sincerely believe that, such type of 
arguments might be also part of a strategy designed to prevent voters’ indignation. 
Efficiency and maximin versus equality 
In the passive defection case of the previous example, Ana must choose between 
(Ana’s, John’s) allocations ( ) and . The former allocation is completely 
egalitarian while the second one is not. As the EM-norm commends to care about efficiency 
and maximin, and not about equality, it follows that a principled Ana chooses the latter 
allocation. Hence, this example shows the importance of the assumption that principled 
people care about the EM-norm and not, say, about an egalitarian norm. In general, this 
hypothesis is particularly well supported by the evidence coming from individual decision 
lab problems with externalities.
dd  , ),0( t
13 As I summarized much of this evidence in López-Pérez 
(2004), I will only provide here two implications of this hypothesis.  
First, people are willing to spend money for the sake of efficiency and maximin. 
Consider a situation in which agent B has no say whereas player A must choose between 
(A, B) pecuniary allocations (4, 4) and (4-ε , 10). If ε  and δ  are small enough (more 
precisely, 6)1( <+⋅ δε ), the only EM-allocation is (4-ε , 10) and hence the EM-norm 
commends to choose it. My model predicts that behavior if player A is principled and if her 
internalization parameter γ is larger than ε  -incidentally, she would clearly opt for (4, 4) 
if she were selfish. In contrast, she would unequivocally choose (4, 4) if she had 
internalized an egalitarian norm like that of function (¡Error! No se encuentra el origen 
de la referencia..     
                                                 
13 The reader may consult Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992), Charness and Rabin (2002), Konow 
(2003), and Engelmann and Strobel (2004). See also Fehr et al. (forthcoming) for some evidence to 
the contrary. 
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Second, people are not willing to spend money just to promote equality. To see 
this, suppose now that A must select either (3, 3) or (4, 6). According to my model, a 
principled or a selfish A always opts for the latter allocation. In contrast, she would choose 
(3,3) if she had internalized an egalitarian norm and her γ  was large enough.      
Lab Games with n Players: Public Goods  
In a simple Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) public good lab game,  
subjects, each one with an endowment of  monetary units, choose simultaneously 
whether to contribute  to a public good or to keep the endowment for them.
2≥n
e
e 14 Subject i 's 
monetary payoff at terminal node z  is given by )(zcem ⋅⋅  if she contributes and by 
 if she does not contribute, where m  denotes the monetary payoff per unit 
of public good and is such that 
)(zceme ⋅⋅+
mnm ⋅<< 1 , and  stands for the number of players 
that contributed to the public good in the history of . Since 
)(zc
z 1<m , the dominant strategy 
in monetary terms is not to contribute. Nevertheless, many experiments report aggregate 
contribution levels around 40-60% -for a survey, consult Ledyard (1995).  
To get behavioral predictions, note first that the EM-norm commends every player 
to contribute because . Let then  (mn ⋅<1 pn nnp ≤≤0 ) denote the number of principled 
players in the group (recall that players’ types are assumed to be common knowledge). 
For any  and pn αγ  , , the VCM lab game has a unique refined equilibrium: 
• If em ⋅⋅< αγ , no player contributes. 
• If em ⋅⋅≥ αγ , no selfish player contributes while a principled player 
contributes only if nnp =  or if nnp <  and 
),,(*)1()1()()1( γααγ
γαγα mn
em
mennemenmenme ppppp =⋅⋅−
++−⋅≥⇔−⋅−⋅+≥⋅+⋅⋅−⋅⋅ .    (5) 
In other words: Principled players respect the EM-norm if sufficiently many others 
do it as well. Note that there exist other equilibria if , but they are not EM 
because at least one principled player does not contribute in them (assumption 1).  
*pp nn ≥
Observe also that , the minimal number of principled agents necessary to 
sustain positive contributions (the critical mass), does not depend on the total number of 
players . Consequently, the probability that a group of n  agents independently drawn 
from the population contains  or more principled players grows with n , so that 
*pn
n
*pn
                                                 
14 In more complex VCM games, players are allowed to contribute a fraction of the endowment, and 
not only the whole one. This is unsubstantial for my model –I come back to this in the conclusion. 
Note also that results do not change substantially if players have heterogeneous endowments , 
although I assume it for expositional simplicity.  
ie
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cooperation should get facilitated as n  increases, a result supported by experimental 
evidence from Isaac and Walker (1994). 
In case player’s types are private knowledge, it is fairly easy to show that principled 
types contribute if ρ  is large enough. In other words: There exist a positive correlation 
between the expectations of a principled agent about aggregate contribution levels and her 
decision to contribute. Abundant experimental evidence bears this point –consult Orbell 
and Dawes (1991), and Sonnemans et al. (1999).15
In addition, experimental evidence from Isaac and Walker (1988) –see also Ledyard 
(1995) for a survey- shows that contribution levels raise if  increases. In this regard, 
inspection of equation (5) points out that  depends negatively on  only if 
m
*pn m γ  and α  
are large and small enough, respectively, so that an increase in m  will foster contributions 
only in those cases. The intuition is that, since contributing has the side-effect of 
increasing deviators’ earnings, the emotional cost of anger must be offset by the emotional 
cost of transgressing the norm in order to find contribution optimal. 
3.2 Competition: Market Lab Games  
Experimental evidence from a broad class of market lab games supports the 
standard prediction that prices converge to the competitive equilibrium –see, for instance, 
the survey in Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 829). Is the model here consistent with that? To 
study this point, consider a market game with proposer competition:  sellers 
(proposers) make simultaneous price offers , , …, and  to sell one unit of a good 
to a single buyer (responder) who demands only one unit of the good. The buyer can 
accept the offer she prefers or reject all of them. 
1−n
1p 2p 1−np
Assume that the responder values one unit of the good in V monetary units. Hence, 
the responder’s monetary payoff if she accepts price offer  (ip }1,..,2,1{ −∈ ni ) is ipV − , 
whereas seller i ’s income is  -unsuccessful sellers get zero money. Finally, all players 
get no money if the responder accepts no offer. 
ip
Before applying the model to this game, it is convenient to consider first the 
prediction when all players are selfish. For any , the game has then a basically 
unique SPE: The responder always accepts the minimum price offer and at least two 
3≥n
                                                 
15 In experiments with finitely repeated public goods games, aggregate contributions fall over time, 
getting very close to the zero level. I will not address this point in detail here, but the model 
suggests that such phenomenon might be due to learning about the number of principled players. 
According to this, (some) principled subjects might arrive at the lab with upwardly biased priors that 
they revise when they observe actual contribution levels. This revision downwards might explain the 
decrease in contributions. Of course, we should abandon the assumption that priors are common in 
order to model such process.  
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proposers offer a price equal to zero.16 The intuition why this equilibrium is unique is 
similar to that behind the Bertrand Duopoly equilibrium, and the reader is directed to a 
Microeconomics textbook for a proof. Finally, note that the standard equilibrium result is 
radically different if 2=n  because then the proposer reaps the whole surplus V  -this is 
the so-called ultimatum game; I briefly study it in section 3.3. 
Consider now the prediction of my model if . The key point here is that all 
allocations in this game are EM -except those that are attained when the responder 
rejects. In effect, all these allocations are efficient and moreover the worst pecuniary 
payoff is zero in all of them –if  there is always at least one unsuccessful seller who 
gets nothing. Therefore, offering any price and accepting it are EM-actions, whereas 
rejecting it is not. This implies in turn that the utility payoffs of any type of player coincide 
with monetary ones unless the responder rejects –in that case, she suffers a utility cost if 
she is principled whereas principled sellers anger at her. It is then easy to show that the 
game has a (basically) unique SPE that coincides with the standard one. Clearly, this result 
does not depend on players’ types being common knowledge. 
3≥n
3≥n
Consider now a market lab game with responder competition. Opposite to the game 
with proposer competition, this game has just one seller (proposer) and n  buyers 
(responders). The proposer moves first by choosing a selling price 
1−
p and then each 
responder decides, unaware of other responders’ choices, whether she accepts or rejects 
p . All players receive a monetary payoff of zero if all responders reject p . In turn, the 
proposer gets p and the buyer if at least one responder accepts - a random draw 
selects with equal probability one of the accepting responders in case more than one 
accepts-, and all other responders receive zero. 
pV −
Note first that there exists a unique SPE if all players are selfish: Responders accept 
any selling price while the proposer makes a price offer of Vp = , thus reaping the whole 
surplus. In fact, one may prove that the game has this unique SPE whatever the players’ 
types if  -the game is the ultimatum game if 3≥n 2=n ; subsection 3.3 studies it. The 
reasons are now familiar: All Pareto-efficient allocations in this game are EM-ones so that 
accepting any price offer is consistent with the EM-norm. Further, as rejection is never 
pecuniary profitable for principled or selfish responders, it follows that responders always 
accept in equilibrium, and a seller consequently asks for the whole surplus. Experimental 
evidence roughly supports this equilibrium prediction –see Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 
832) for references. 
3.3 Punishment 
In a two-player game, player A punishes B when she imposes a cost on B without 
getting any immediate material reward as a result. According to the model, A punishes B 
                                                 
16 Many strategy profiles satisfy this, but they only differ in the distribution of offers of the remaining 
 sellers, which is inconsequential for the final result. Hence, the equilibrium outcome is unique. 3−n
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only if B has transgressed a norm that A cares about and which A herself has not violated. 
Intuitively, B’s deviation triggers an aggressive emotion in A that goes associated with an 
impulse to retaliate. 
As an illustration, consider the decision tree at Figure 3, where only monetary 
payoffs are depicted. The first mover can offer either (player 1’s, player 2’s) allocation (8, 
2) or (5, 5), and then the second mover can accept (A) or reject (R) the offer. Both 
players get zero money if she rejects. Otherwise, the offer is implemented. This lab game 
is a simplified version of an Ultimatum Game with stakes equal to 10 monetary units –the 
difference is that the range of offers in the ultimatum game consists of all possible 
divisions of the stakes. I stick to this simple version because it is sufficient to show how 
punishment works -for a detailed analysis of the model’s predictions in the Ultimatum lab 
game, consult López-Pérez 2004. 
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                                         Figure 3: A Mini-Ultimatum Lab Game  
As (5, 5) is the unique EM-allocation of this game, the EM-norm clearly commends 
player 1 to offer (5, 5) and player 2 to accept it. On the other hand, if player 1 deviates 
from the norm and offers (8, 2), the EM-norm allows player 2 to choose any move. Arrows 
in Figure 3 indicate that the associated action is selected by the EM-norm. 
The game has a unique refined SPE. In it, a selfish second mover accepts any offer. 
Further, a principled second mover accepts offer (5, 5), rejects (8, 2) if α⋅−> 820  and 
accepts it if α⋅−< 820 . In the marginal case 25.0=α , a principled second mover is 
indifferent between accepting or rejecting (8, 2) so that there are two SPE. However, only 
the one in which the second mover accepts is EM (assumption 1). 
In turn, the first mover’s offer depends on both players’ types, as Table 1 indicates. 
The first column in this matrix shows player 1’s type, while the first row shows player 2’s 
type. For instance, player 1 abides by the EM-norm and offers (5, 5) independently of the 
co-player’s type if she is principled and 3≥γ .17  
 
 
                                                 
17 There are two SPE if 3=γ  and the second mover accepts (8, 2). However, the equilibrium in 
which player 1 offers (8, 2) is not EM and can thus be ruled out (assumption 1). 
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                   Player 2’s type is… 
Player 1’s type is…   
… selfish or principled  
with 25.0<α . 
… principled  
With 25.0>α . 
… selfish or principled with 3<γ . (8, 2) (5, 5) 
… principled and 3≥γ . (5, 5) (5, 5) 
              Table 1: Player 1’s SPE offer depending on her type and the second mover’s. 
Note that this result can be easily extended to an incomplete information setting. 
Obviously, a selfish first mover or a principled one with 3<γ  should condition their choice 
on their prior about the second mover’s type -the reader may easily compute the minimal 
prior that makes offer (8, 2) optimal.  
Experimental data from ultimatum games –see Camerer (2003, pp. 48-55) for an 
informative survey- confirms that the 50-50 offer is almost always accepted, whereas low 
offers face a high probability of rejection. Studies also show that “very large changes in 
stakes have only a modest effect on rejections”,18 something that is barely consistent with 
my model –if a principled second mover rejects (8, 2) in the lab game of Figure 3 then she 
also rejects offer (8·k, 2·k) when stakes are k>0 times bigger. 
The analysis shows that punishment depends on parameter α  -which, incidentally, 
could be estimated from experimental data. In fact, if one extended the model by 
assuming that principled players are heterogeneous regarding their aggressiveness –i.e., 
parameter α -, a law of demand would follow: The more costly punishment is the less of it 
there is. To see this, consider a slightly modified version of the lab game at Figure 3 in 
which allocation (6, 4) replaces allocation (8, 2). Since (5, 5) is still the only EM-allocation, 
a principled second mover will anger if she is offered (6, 4). Nevertheless, punishing (i.e., 
rejecting) such offer is more costly than rejecting offer (8, 2) and hence only optimal if α  
is relatively large –more precisely, if 32>α  holds. To sum up, principled agents use 
relatively costly punishment technologies only if they are aggressive enough. 
Another interesting issue concerns responsibility (or ‘intentions’, to use the usual 
terminology). As an illustration, assume that player 1 has no say in the lab game of Figure 
3 and that his offer is decided by a random device. As player 1 cannot be blamed for 
anything that happens in the game, a principled player 2 will not anger at him and hence 
will not reject any offer. Therefore, and in comparison with the intentional treatment, the 
model predicts a smaller rate of rejection in the random treatment, something that is 
consistent with the experimental results reported by Blount (1995). To sum up, the model 
                                                 
18 Camerer (2003, pp. 61). 
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indicates that responsibility is crucial to understand who is punished because it predicts 
that only wrongdoers get punished.  
The word ‘intentions’ also refers sometimes to the influence of non-chosen 
alternatives. To illustrate this point, consider a slight variation of the lab game of Figure 3, 
in which allocation (10, 0) replaces allocation (5, 5), and compare the rejection rate of 
offer (8, 2) in this new game and in the former game. Does the model predict a difference? 
Yes. As offer (8, 2) constitutes a deviation from the EM-norm when the alternative is (5, 
5), but not when the alternative is (10, 0), the model clearly predicts a larger rejection 
rate in the former case –in fact, it predicts that nobody rejects (8, 2) if the alternative is 
(10, 0). More generally, whether an action constitutes a norm transgression depends on 
the available alternatives, and that explains why an act with the same material 
consequences may be punished in one game but not in another. This prediction is highly 
consistent with the experimental evidence –see Camerer (2003, p. 81-82). 
4. Comparison with Other Utility Models 
It can be illustrative to compare the behavioral predictions of the model with those 
from other models.19 With regard first to cooperation and punishment, the model has been 
shown to be consistent with seven well-replicated experimental phenomena:  
(1) A significant number of people cooperate in the simultaneous PD lab game, or 
contribute in a one-shot public good lab game. 
(2) Subjects also contribute in the sequential PD, and the rate at which first movers 
cooperate is larger than average cooperation in the simultaneous PD. 
(3) Subjects often give money to passive players (dummies). 
(4) Subjects tend to treat equally kindly both dummies and kind active players 
(absence of positive reciprocity). 
(5) Many subjects sacrifice equality of payments in order to increase efficiency 
and/or the worst-off player’s payoff. 
(6) Punishment depends on the menu of alternatives that the punished person had 
available. 
(7) Dummies are rarely punished (responsibility). 
Table 2 indicates whether other utility theories are consistent with facts (1) to (7). 
Entry YES indicates that the corresponding theory is consistent with the fact, whereas 
entry NO indicates the opposite. For brevity, I consider just four models, each one 
representing a different research line in the existing literature. Models of inequity aversion 
like Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) represent pure 
consequentialistic models in which people only have distributional concerns –other 
examples include the model of quasi-maximin preferences of Charness and Rabin (2002). 
Rabin (1993) is a pure reciprocity model with no distributional concerns, as Dufwenberg 
                                                 
19 Consult López-Pérez, R. (2004) for a more lengthy discussion. 
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and Kirchsteiger (2004). Falk and Fischbacher (2006) introduce both reciprocal and 
distributional concerns. Finally, Levine (1998) is a model of type-based reciprocity. 
    
             Facts 
Theories 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Rabin (1993) YES NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Levine (1998) YES YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Inequity aversion YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
F&F (2006) NO YES YES NO NO YES NO 
                                Table 2: Predictions by Other Utility Models  
The interested reader is directed to the relevant papers for a detailed explanation of 
these predictions. Finally, all models but Rabin (1993) can explain the experimental results 
from market lab games, although some remarks could be made. To mention one, models 
of inequity aversion predict the standard solution in the market game with proposer 
competition if the responder is restricted to accept or reject the highest price offer but not 
if she is given the opportunity to choose any offer, in which case a very inequity-averse 
responder would rather accept an egalitarian sharing of the surplus. Note that this 
distinction is immaterial in my model.  
5. Conclusion and Extensions 
This paper shows that a large set of experimental evidence can be explained if one 
assumes that (some) people care about a particular norm of distributive justice. The model 
appears to be empirically more accurate than other models of non-selfish preferences. 
Moreover, it is much simpler and precise than other models of reciprocity. 
There are some possible ways to extend the model. A natural one is considering 
other norms that the EM-norm. For instance, one could assume that some people have 
internalized a norm of honesty, and study how it affects communication. One could also 
think of more realistic norms of distributive justice. The EM-norm is too strict in that it 
allows any behavior after a deviation occurs. Less draconian norms would take into 
account the welfare of those players who have hitherto respected the norm –López-Pérez 
(2005) gives particular examples. Further, the EM-norm is probably too austere in that it 
only allows EM-actions. However, people seem to have a more flexible view of what is 
correct: ‘Small’ deviations from the ideal moral behavior –e.g. the EM-path in the model- 
are usually considered valid as well, and they do not trigger anger. 
Some of the motivational hypothesis of the model could be also relaxed. First, the 
model assumes that the intensity of remorse does not depend on the specific deviation one 
makes from an internalized norm. But it seems realistic to assume that remorse is higher 
depending on the material consequences of the deviation20 –e.g., killing someone should 
generate stronger remorse than just hurting him. This hypothesis and an additional one of 
                                                 
20 I have investigated this point in López-Pérez (2005). 
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decreasing marginal utility of money could explain, for instance, why participants in public 
good games often contribute something between zero and their endowment. Second, but 
closely related, it might be more realistic to assume that the intensity of anger at a 
deviator depends on the specific misbehavior and its consequences.   
As a final remark, the model here should motivate further experimental research on 
social norms, emotions, and reciprocity. Further, it might be used to study how norms 
based on political ideologies (or religious beliefs) and aggressive emotions like anger shape 
political violence, terrorism, and revolutions; or how a sense of duty and the associated 
emotions of guilt and shame affect voters’ turnout, to give some examples.  
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